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ABSTRACT
In this work, we address the security of VANETs. We pro-
vide a detailed threat analysis and devise an appropriate
security architecture. We also describe some major design
decisions still to be made, which in some cases have more
than mere technical implications. We provide a set of se-
curity protocols, we show that they protect privacy and we
analyze their robustness, and we carry out a quantitative
assessment of the proposed solution.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: General—Security and protec-
tion
General Terms: Design, Security
Keywords: vehicular networks, security
1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, road vehicles were the realm of mechani-
cal engineers. But with the plummeting costs of electronic
components and the permanent willingness of the manufac-
turers to increase road safety and to differentiate themselves
from their competitors, vehicles are becoming “computers
on wheels”, or rather “computer networks on wheels”. Man-
ufacturers are about to make a quantum step in terms of ve-
hicular IT, by letting vehicles communicate with each other
and with roadside infrastructure; in this way, vehicles will
dramatically increase their awareness of their environment,
thereby increasing safety and optimizing traffic. Considering
the tremendous benefits expected from vehicular communi-
cations and the huge number of vehicles (hundreds of mil-
lions worldwide), it is clear that vehicular communications
are likely to become the most relevant realization of mobile
ad hoc networks. The appropriate integration of on-board
computers and positioning devices such as GPS receivers,
along with communication capabilities, open tremendous
business opportunities, but also raise formidable research
challenges. One of these challenges is security; limited at-
tention has been devoted so far to the security of vehicular
networks [1, 2, 4]. Yet, security is crucial. It is essential to
make sure that life-critical information cannot be inserted
or modified by an attacker; likewise, the system should be
able to help establish the liability of drivers; but it should
also protect the privacy of the drivers and passengers.
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2. ATTACKS ON VANETS
We focus on the security aspects of safety-related appli-
cations, such as collision avoidance and cooperative driv-
ing. We have identified several attacks on the safety mes-
sages: Bogus information, Cheating with positioning infor-
mation, ID disclosure of other vehicles in order to track
their location, Denial of Service, and Masquerade. The
attacker can be Insider/Outsider, Malicious/Rational, Ac-
tive/Passive. Detailed descriptions of the attacks and the
attacker model can be found in [3].
3. HOW TO SECURE VANETS
A security system for safety messaging in a VANET should
satisfy the following requirements to be able to thwart any
generic attack on vehicular networks:Authentication, Veri-
fication of data consistency, Availability, Non-repudiation,
Privacy, and Real-time constraints.
Digital signatures are a better choice than symmetric au-
thentication mechanisms in the VANET setting, because
safety messages should be sent to receivers as fast as possi-
ble. In fact, a preliminary handshake is not acceptable and
actually creates more overhead. In addition, given the huge
amount of network members and the sporadic connectivity
to authentication servers, a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
is the most suitable way for implementing authentication (in
[3], we provide performance evaluation of different Public
Key Cryptosystems and show that some of them are suit-
able for VANETs). Under the PKI solution, each vehicle
will be assigned a public/private key pair. Before a vehi-
cle sends a safety message, it signs it with its private key
and includes the CA’s (Certification Authority) certificate
as follows (T is the timestamp):
V → ∗ :M,SigPrKV [M |T ], CertV
The receivers of the message have to extract and verify
the public key of V using the certificate and then verify V ’s
signature using its certified public key. In order to do this,
the receiver should have the public key of the CA, which can
be preloaded as described below. If the message is sent in an
emergency context, this message should be stored (including
the signature and the certificate) in the EDR (Event Data
Recorder, reminiscent of the “black boxes” used in avionics)
for further potential investigations about the emergency.
The use of secret information such as private keys incurs
the need for a tamper-proof device in each vehicle. In ad-
dition to storing the secret information, this device will be
also responsible for signing outgoing messages.
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3.1 Key management
To be part of a VANET, each vehicle has to store the
following cryptographic information:
1. An electronic identity called an Electronic License Plate
(ELP) if issued by the government, or alternatively an
Electronic Chassis Number (ECN ) if issued by the ve-
hicle manufacturer. These identities should be unique
and cryptographically verifiable. The governmental
transportation authority will preload the ELP at the
time of vehicle registration (in the case of the ECN,
the manufacturer is responsible for its installation at
production time).
2. Anonymous key pairs that are used to preserve privacy.
An anonymous key pair is a public/private key pair
that is authenticated by the CA but contains no in-
formation about the actual identity of the vehicle (i.e.,
its ELP). Yet this anonymity is conditional for liability
purposes. Normally, a vehicle will possess a large set
of anonymous keys to prevent tracking. Anonymous
keys are preloaded by the transportation authority or
the manufacturer and periodically renewed.
Certification Authorities (CA) will be responsible for is-
suing key certificates to vehicles. Two solutions can be en-
visioned:
1. Governmental transportation authorities : Vehicles will
be registered in different countries by the correspond-
ing transportation authorities (which are usually re-
gional). The advantage of this option is that the cer-
tification procedure will be under the direct control of
the concerned authority.
2. Vehicle manufacturers: Certificates can also be issued
by vehicle manufacturers, given their limited number
and the trust already endowed in them. The advantage
of this approach is reduced overhead.
We consider two key revocation scenarios depending on
the information compromised by the attacker:
1. All the cryptographic material belonging to a vehicle
is compromised. To avoid the overhead of revoking
all the keys of this vehicle, the CA will revoke them
by sending secure revocation messages to the tamper-
proof device.
2. A particular key of a vehicle’s key set is compromised.
In this case, sending a revocation message to the tamper-
proof device for each revoked key would cause a large
overhead. We opt for using short key certificate life-
times that will make key certificates expire, thus re-
voking the keys.
3.2 Verification by correlation
In the bogus information attack, one or several legitimate
members of the network send out false information to mis-
guide other vehicles about traffic conditions. To thwart such
misbehavior, data received from a given source should be
verified by correlating them with those received from other
sources. This is typically done by reputation-based systems.
It is important to stress here that what matters is the rating
of the correctness of the data rather than its source.
Figure 1: ID disclosure attack.
3.3 Anonymity
In order to preserve the driver’s anonymity and minimize
the storage costs of public keys, we propose a key changing
algorithm that adapts to the vehicle speed and takes into
account key correlation by the attacker. Let us consider the
typical tracking scenario where the attacker controls station-
ary base stations separated by a distance datt and captures
all the received safety messages. Assume the speed of target
V is vt, its transmission range is dr, and dv is the distance
over which a vehicle does not change its speed and lane (the
vulnerability window with respect to the correlation of iden-
tifiers, including keys, by an attacker). As Fig. 1 illustrates,
the vehicle’s anonymity is vulnerable over a distance equal
to dv + 2dr. This means that it is not worth changing the
key over smaller distances because an observer can correlate
keys with high probability. This defines the lower bound on
the key changing interval Tkey:
min(Tkey) =
dv + 2dr
vt
seconds (1)
But if datt > dv+2dr, V can avoid being tracked (by chang-
ing its key) as long as it does not use the same key for a
distance equal to or longer than datt. This in turn defines
the upper bound on the key changing interval:
max(Tkey) =
datt
vt
seconds (2)
Since V does not know datt, but knows dr and dv, it can
choose a value of Tkey that is a little larger than min(Tkey).
If we denote by rm the message sending rate for V , one key
should be used for:
Nmsg = drm × Tkeye messages (3)
4. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have explained why vehicular networks
need to be secured, and why this problem requires a specific
approach. We have also identified the major threats. We
have then proposed a security architecture along with the
related protocols; we have shown how and to what extent it
protects privacy. In terms of future work, we intend to fur-
ther develop this proposal and perform additional numerical
evaluations of the solutions.
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